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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
-~

--·

HEBER \V. GLENN,
Pla.intiff and A ppella;nt,

-vs.-

Case No. 7952

GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant and ReszJondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEl\ll~NT

OF F ACTR

The appellant is also the plaintiff and the respondent i:-; the defendant, and hereafter, the parties will be
referred to as plaintiff and defendant.
Defendant does not·feel that plaintiff has fully stated
the facts, nor e1nphasized those that are controlling.
Therefore, as briefly as possible and without undue repetion we shall atte1npt to point out to the court those facts
which seen1 to us to be determinative and decisive in this
case.
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Defendant is the owner of the property upon which
the slide occurred drunaging plaintiff's shovel. It is situated in South Dav1s County, east of the road leading to
Val Verda whe-re the cutoff takes place frmn Beck Street
going north, and consists of n1ountainous country used
for many years for gravel pit operations (R. 26, 27, 408).
Although the property was under lease to Gordon T.
Hyde, operating as the White Hill Sand & Gravel Company, the defendant as the owner had reserved the right
to come upon its own property and take the gravel from
it (R. 31). The defendant for n1any years has owned and
operated many other gravel pits in this and other areas
(R. 408).
Defendant testified that there is no standard procedure in operating gravel pits. There are many wayi',
but not any particular one is standard. It all depends on
how you want to handle the gravel after you get it out.
It can be extracted with a dragline, dozed down with a
dozer, pushed over a trap, loaded with a shovel, loaded
with a dragline, loaded with a back hoe, or loaded with
an elevating grader, or pushed on to a belt conveyor.
There is nothing unusual about using a shovel to excaya te a gravel pit. "That is probably the major reason
that a shovel was developed." To take 1naterial out of a
mountain. It b; not adapted to digging holes or to earr~·
ing dirt long distances. It wa~ originated to operate particularly in gravel and sand pits and one of the most common methods of operating a gravel pit is hy means of a
shovel (R. 409-410).
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On July 19, 1951, the defendant started to renwve
gravel from its pit involved in this case. Fron1 then until
August 16, it had excavated frmn the mountain with its
own shovel and without blasting 24,211 yards of earth.
Frmn August 16, until October 13, 1951, 49,175 yards of
additional gravel was taken from its pit by the defendant
so that defendant took from the pit 73,386 yards. On October 8, one Yic K ewman began working in the pit with
his shovel and he n1oved 6, 784 yards of gravel. He loaded
this into defendant's trucks for lOc a yard. He had a
shovel of his own and so far as the defendant knew he
was using his own shovel. Newman was an independent
contractor hired by l\Ir. Reed, one of the defendant's
officers, and worked under the supervision of the defendant's foreman ~I r. Keith, neither of whom knew of
any interest of the plaintiff in the shovel used by Newman. All Kewman was hired to do was pick up the gravel
with his shovel and load it into defendant's trucks; his
man operated the shovel and all the defendant did was
to furnish the trucks and Newman loaded then1. He could
go any place he cared to as long as he got the material
the defendant could use for its customer (R. 406, 407, 362,
363).
The defendant had an order to furnish material to
be used as fill for the Phillips Petroleum Company and
indicated at the beginning of its operations that probably
about 20,000 yards would be needed. Defendant started
in at the base of the hill, which had not been theretofore
worked, and proceeded with a shovel to work from south
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end of the property to the north in a sort of half circle
from the base of the hill and on into the undisturbed
mountain (R. 30, 31, and 349, 350). The record contains
a good deal of testimony about who originally handled
the gravel and whose shovel did the original shoveling
and so forth, which is irnmaterial to the points involved
in this appeal, and we shall, therefore, not detail such
evidence. The record is also full of staternents and estirnates as to the height of the vertical bank created by the
shovel and blasting operations in excavating the gravel
on defendant's land. The testinrony of the man who was
actually doing the blasting was that on October 13, the
highest point from the ground level to the top of the cliff
was smne 65 feet and about lj2 of this or :3:2lj~ feet \Ya~
undisturbed and loose rnaterial sloping away from the
face, 80 that the so-called vertical cliff was about 3:2~ i
feet; then came the sloping material which extended out
about 32 feet at an angle of 45° (R. 327). The defendant's foren1an testified to the same thing and also that :20
feet in height from the bottom of this sloping material
was solid dirt that had never been disturbed, topped h~·
an additional ten feet of slough (R. 359, 360). It also appears that what is referred to hy appellant as the vertical
wall is not vertical at all, and never was vertical and was
never steeper than a one to one slope. The face was never
perpendicular (R. 352, 353).
As defendant proceeded with the securing of material
it became

necessar~·

eventually to ns<:> some

rl~·namite

to blast in the uwuntain in order that there would he
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loose Inaterial slough off to be picked up later by the
shovels. Defendant at first used its own shovel and as
heretofore indicated later engaged N ew1nan with his
shovel to continue the loading of the trucks.
Blasting begun, H8 above indicated, on August 16, was
done after hours by e1nployees of Mr. Hyde (White Hill
Sand & Gravel), who were paid for this work by defendant. Defendant's fore1nan states that the blasting was always done after 4:30 in the afternoon. Son1e days they
would not blast at all because there would be enough
loose Inateria~ (R. 355). Between about September 15
and October 13, very little material was moved fr01n
the pit by defendant. In that period White Hill Sand
& Gravel loaded about 4,000 yards, and Newman loaded
about 6,000, so that in the last month before the slide only
about 10,000 yards were moved- from the pit (R. 413).
As we have already indicated, up to August 16, 2-±,000 yards were moved; in the last month 10,000, so that
between August 16, and the middle of September, more
than half of all the material was moved from the pit.
Mr. Dastrup who was the Superintendent of White
Hill Sand & Gravel, and an experienced powder man,
and who had been doing the blasting for the defendant
( R. 115, et. seq.), testified that on October 13, which was
Saturday, the day before the slide, they used 32 sticks
of dynamite, just one shot, and felt that as a result there
would be

plent~·

of Inaterial in the morning for the shovel
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to scoop up and load into the trucks (R. 121). However,
sometime during the night the entire 1nountain broke
loose several hundred yards back from the place where
the excavating and blasting was being done and moved
from the southeast to the northwest, covered up the shovel
being used by Newman, which we learned after the slide
was owned by the plaintiff, covered some of the sheds
of the White Hill Sand & Gravel and a good deal of the
White Hill Sand & Gravel equipment, which was located
up on the mountain far distant from the excavating operations. Mr. Hyde estimated probably half to threequarters of a million yards of material n10ved in the slide
(R. 68, 69).
Although no witness knew or testified to what caused
this terrific slide, Dr. Cook, a witness for the plaintiff
purported to advance a theory based upon hypothetical
assumptions not present in the case. He assumed that
there was a straight up and down cliff, a distance of 80
to 100 feet on a solid clay base, saturated with water,
loosened by terrific blasting, so that the mountain slid
out like a pea in a pod on the clay base. However, an examination of his testimony demonstrates that it is of
very little value in this case. First, there is no evidence
of a vertical cliff 80 to 100 feet high. There is no evidence of a clay base, nor is there any evidence of water
saturation. Dr. Cook admitted that he didn't know the
extent of the clay, but it looked like it would be about
six or eight feet, but he didn't know how far back it went
(R. 219). It sloped downward from west to east so that
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the Inountain would have to go up hill to nwve on the clay
(R. :220) : that in order to state that the clay was an iinportant factor in the slide, he would have to know more
about it. He sun11narized his own evidence as follows:
··Q.

In order to consider the clay was an iinportant factor in the Lreak, wouldn't you have to
know how extensive it was? Where it was,
sOinething about it J?

A.

Actually you would and I mn expressing thi.;
1nerely as a theory. I agree. I don't know
what exactly caused this break. I say that the
evidence that is there I would suspect, as a
result of the evidence there, that there was a
clay bed underneath this burden. We see a
clay bed. Now that is in about the right position for it to have caused this particular difficulty. And I will tell you one other thing that
~~ou know beyond any question-

Q.

X o"·, wait a minute, before we leave this.
You don't know where the clay bed is except
where you saw it in this one spot out there~

A.

you see in its position with respect to the
of the burden that it was near the bottOin
of the break. It was near the bottom of the
material.

\\~ell

re~t

~ay,
Cook~

Q.

I

A.

That's correct. You can't see into the face.

Q.

So you can't tell without knowing the extent
of the clay bed whether it was a factor or

you don't know how extensive it is, Dr.

not~
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A.

That's right. You need to know all of those
details to know that.

Q.

That's right. You need to know that. And
you don't know that~

~-\..

That's right. I only suspect that that was the
situation." (R. 233).

Although he also stated that the explosives were a
factor at page 225, he then said the following in contradiction:
"A.

No, indeed. I don't believe that the explosives
had anything to do with the break practically,
only a slight amount. It doesn't have a direct,
it wasn't the direct cause of the break."

Yery little material was moved in blasting "sometimes there would be a ton or so at other times several
tons cmne down." This is the testimony of the man who
actually did the blasting (R. 313, 134).
It also appears from the record, not only that there

was no solid clay base, but that it was not saturated with
water. The clay only appeared occasionally, and the
water only appeared once in a while. No witness testified
that there was a saturated clay base. The defendant':-;
foreman,

~r r.

Keith, testified that earlier in the work

water was encountered, but as they proceeded back into
the 1nountain it disappeared (R. 362). Neither ~rr. Gibbons nor :\I r. Reed had seen water and :\I r. Gibbons had
seen no clay (R. -!12, 418).
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Hansen, the original shovel operator for the
defendant on this project, objected to working on the
project when blasting operations began. He estimated
that he had moved out a:bout 50,000 yards of earth with
the Gibbons and Reed shovel, and that at that time, th~
pit was not a great deal bigger than it was when 20,000
yards had been n1oved out. He objected to working any
longer because the operation was dangerous to the shovel
operator (R. 180). There was always a slope at the
bottom and at the top and it was never straight up and
down. The blasting occurred intermittently only over a
period of about a rnonth (R. 183).
There are many staternents in the record about the
danger of this operation, but that danger was only to the
men working under the cliff from sloughing or from falling rocks. :Jir. Hyde obviously didn't think that the operation was dangerous to hirn. He did not move his own
rnachinery and equipment and it was covered over. He
stated that while he didn't go in under the cliff because
of the personal danger he didn't anticipate that anything
would happen such as did happen. He didn't expect a
slide to cover up his equipment. He didn't expect it at all.
The danger that he was afraid of was to the person operating under the cliff. He never expected any slide of the
character that occurred (R. 81, 82, 83). He felt that when
they were blasting that was dangerous to anyone near the
blasting (R. 88). 1-Ie had no objection to his own superintendent and other employees working at the blasting as
long

a~

they were doing it on their own time (R. 92).
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~fr.

C. \Y. Spence, a witness for plaintiff and a former state inspector stated that he couldn't expect the
whole 1nountain to move; the blasting nlight be dangerous for men who were near it, but you don't expect the
whole mountain to 1nove (R. 161).
Defendant's foreman, Mr. Keith, testified that on the
13th of October, 1951, he saw nothing different than on
previous days (R. 359); that there was nothing to indicate that such a slide would occur, or that there was danger of such sliding (R. 373); that there was just a little
water pocket in the formation at the northwest ::-ide;
he only saw water a time or two (R. 385); that he would
have done this operation just as he did had he known
from the beginning that there was going to he taken out
of the pit the amount that was taken out. He realized
that there would be a little danger fron1 the sloughing
and to the powder men who were up digging the hole,
"but he didn't know there was going to be anything like a
slide like that." ( R. 394).
On October 13, 1951 the plaintiff came out to the
gravel pit looking for his shovel. He had loaned it to
Newman who is a contractor in Salt Lake Cit~T' with
whom he trades work frequently, and he had done so prior
to this time. Newman works for himself and when ht>
took the shovel he told plaintiff he was going to work at
the \Yhite Hill Sand & Gravel Company with which opt>ra tion the plaintiff was fmniliar. Plaintiff did not know
how he intended to use the shovel and made no pffort to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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find out. Xewn1an said he would use the shovel for about
three days and later trade work with plaintiff for that
three days work. On October 13, \vhen the plaintiff went
out to the gravel pit looking for his shovel; about 3 :00
o'clock in the afternoon he found Perry, who was Newnlan' s man, running the shovel between the sheds of the
"~hite

Hill Sand & Gravel and the bank. He was loading

dirt within 20 feet of the bank.

"Q. And what did you

do~

A.

I called the 1nan off the shovel and told hin1
to get it out of there and do it fast.

Q.

And did

A.

X o, he did not.

Q.

Did you stay there until he got it

A.

:K o sir. I did not.

Q.

Did you make any other effort to get it

A.

I didn't have time.

Q.

Did you make any effort that day to get it

he~

out~

out~

out~

A.

I tried to find Vic Newman or some of Gibbons and Reed's men, and I could not find
them. I drove down to the petroleum company
and tried to find somebody down there that
knew something about it and as it happened
I missed them. They had just left there and
that was all the effort that I tried to get it
out. * * *

Q.

And it wa~ dangerous, looked dangerous to
you \vhere he was working~
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A.

Absolutely dangerous.

Q.

And so you went off and left your equipment in this dangerous condition~

A.

I didn't have any, I had on my good clothes,
my car was in danger. I didn't want to leave
my car there.

Q.

Well I just asked you, Mr. Glenn, you went
off and left your shovel there~

A.

That's right.

Q.

Left your shovel in that dangerous place?

A.

That is it. I guess I did it.

Q.

And did nothing more about it that day?

A.

That's right." (R. 290, 291, 299, 301, 302).

:\Ir. Keith was at the pit and

~f r.

Perry remained

there until 4:30 trying to get the shovel to work. On this
night the shovel wouldn't go forward, but it would go
ba·ckwards, and Perry parked it 100 to 150 feet from the
face of the cliff (R. 128, 129). It appeared to be in a safe
place (R. 127).
:Jlr. Glenn, the plaintiff, knew how to run the shovel
and could have moved it away himself had he so desired.
He did not rent the shovel to Gibbons & Reed. He rented
it to Vic Newman who stated he would use it for about
three days and when Glenn went out for it, Newman had
had it about two weeks. The plaintiff is a contractor
8pecializing in roads and excavating, and has been in that
business for 35 years ( R. 289, 307).
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'Ye had nothing to do with detennining where the
shovel would be left. The shovel opera tor would back it
up to what he thought was a safe distance (R. 135).
PRELI~IINARY

STATEMENT

Defendant does not believe that the plaintiff has
correctly approached the problmn involved here. The defendant does not feel that its negligence or lack of negligence is an issue, nor does it feel that in this case it had
any burden of proving or establishing the contributor~~
negligence of the plaintiff. We shall, therefore, present
the proble1n to the court under the following headings :
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. IN THE OPERATION OF ITS OWN PROPERTY, WAS THE DEFENDANT UNDER ANY DUTY TO
ACCOUNT TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE METHOD USED.
POINT II. THERE IS NO ACTIONABLE
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE.

NEGLI-

POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECT TO
IT.
POINT IV. A CONSIDERATION
POSITION AND BRIEF.

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

ARGUMENT
POINT I. IN THE OPERATION OF ITS OWN PROPERTY, WAS THE DEFENDANT UNDER ANY DUTY TO
ACCOUNT TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE METHOD USED.
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The defendant is the owner of the property upon
which the plaintiff's shovel was being used. Defendant
had no contract, express or implied, with the plaintiff
for the use of his shovel. It did have an agreement
with Newman whereby it paid him for shoveling the sand
and gravel into its trucks for a specified price.
Newman was an independent contractor engaged to
do certain work on the defendant's property for a consideration. He furnished his own equipment. So far as the
defendant knew the shovel belonged to Newman. It had
no relationship whatsoever with the plaintiff. Xewman
and the plaintiff had an agreement of benefit to both
whereby plaintiff loaned his shovel to Newman, in return
for the future use of Newman's shovel by the plaintiff.
Defendant had no part in this transaction, nor did it
know of it. Newman used the shovel as he saw fit. Defendant had no control over its use or operation, nor did
it e·xercise any control over it, nor did it tell Newman
where he should leave the shovel at the conclusion of the
day's 'vork. Newman was either a mere licensee or a very
limited invitee. If he was a licensee, that is, "a person
who enters upon the property of another for his own eonvenience, pleasure or benefit," then we owed him no
duty
"* * * except not to harm him wilfullY or
wantonly, or to set traps for him, or to expose. him
to danger reeklessl~· or wantonlv." 38 A 111. ,/11 r.
765,par. 104.
·

If he was an Invitee:
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"There i~ no liability for injuries fro1n dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as
well known to the person injured as they are to
the owner or occupant." 38 Am. J ztr., 757, 758, par.

97.
N ew1nan was hired to do the very thing complained
about by the plaintiff. X ewman not only knew the conditions present, but \Hl~ actively engaged for compensation in assisting in the creation of the alleged dangerous
condition.
As to the plaintiff:
Defendant never invited the plaintiff to place his
shovel on its property nor did it give him a license to do
so. Had the plaintiff himself been present with his
shovel, he would have been a trespasser.
The conditions surrounding the work were open and
obviou::; and no witness, nor anyone else, had any reason
to believe that the operations 'being conducted upon the
land would cause the tremendous slide that occurred.
K or is there any evidence that the operations did cause
a slide. No one knows what caused it. It is an unexplained catastrophe.
Plaintiff complains that the defendant was not operating the pit in the nonnal way. The owners of the pit
are experienced men and they and their foreman stated
that

the~,

which

wa~

were operating it in the only practical way,
also normal and usual, in order to extract
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the limited amount of gravel required by the defendant.
Defendant was the one to detennine how its pit should
be worked.
It is ele1nentary that
''An action to recover dan1ages for an injury
sustained by the plaintiff on the theory that they
were caused by the negligence of the defendant
will not lie unless it appears that there existed,
at the time and place where the injury was inflicted, a duty on the part of the defendant and a
corresponding right in the plaintiff for the protection of the latter." 38 Am. Jur., par. 12, page 652.
So far as the defendant knew Newman was using
his own shovel. The actual fact is that he was using the
shovel at a place the plaintiff knew about, where he had
a right to use it with the plaintiff's consent. The defendant owed to the plaintiff no greater duty than it did to
Newman. It had no relationship whatsoever, express or
implied, with the plaintiff. It did not request the plaintiff to loan Newman his shovel; it did not request Newman to use the plaintiff's shovel; the plaintiff had no
right to have his shovel on the defendant's property except through Newman.
''In other words, there can be no actionable
negligence where there is no act or service or contract which a party is bound to perfonn or fulfil.
While the existence of a duty to use due care may
be predicated merely upon a relation between the
parties, and while its extent depends in the last
analysis upon the circumstances of the particular
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case, it is of necessity a real duty in every case
of negligence, not to he supplied by proof of mere
usuage or custom, and the care which must he observed in its performance is measured by a definite standard." 38 Am. Jur., par. 12, pages 654,
655.
The evidence 1n this case is undisputed that defendant was operating its property as it had a right to
operate it. All of the conditions known to the defendant
were as open and obvious to Newman, plain tiff or anyone else as they were to the defendant. The defendant
had no control over the shovel or where it was left and
never attempted to exercise any control of any kind
over it. It owed no duty to Newman or the plaintiff and

"It is essential to liability for negligence, then,
that the parties shall have sustained a relationship
recognized by law as the foundation of a duty
of care; some relationship must exist between the
one inflicting the injury and the person injured,
by which the fonner owes some duty to the la~ter.''
38 Am. Jur., par. 1-±, page 656.
Cases of highway accidents, automobile collisions and
the like are not in point here because here the injury
arose on defendant's own property, to one on the property for his own profit and under conditions which he
himself was assisting in creating and which were as open
and obvious to hin1 as they were to anyone else. Neither
plaintiff nor anyone else had the right to tell the defendant how it should operate its property.
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The evidence without conflict shows :
1. That in the operation of our own property we
owed no duty of any kind to the plaintiff; we never requested the plaintiff to bring his shovel on our property
and never even knew that it was his shovel.
2.

That the plaintiff never at any time had any

right to tell us how we should operate our pit; we had the
right to operate as in our judgment best suited our purposes.
3.

The plaintiff made his own arrangements with

Newman for Newman to use his shovel and these arrangements were for the benefit both of Newman and
the plaintiff. Newman for his own and plaintiff's profit
brought the shovel as his own on our property. Newman
himself was a part of the operation and his own acts
aided in the creation of any alleged danger, and all of the
circmnstances, the method of shoveling, the blasting, the
loading, and actual condition of the ground, its condition as the work progressed, were as open, obvious and
apparent to plaintiff and Newman as they were to us.
4.

We had no knowledge, express or implied, of

any dangerous trap, latent or concealed perils, or of any
other facts which would lead us or any other reasonable
person to assume that the thing that actually occurred
would occur as a result of our operations.
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POINT II. THERE IS NO ACTIONABLE
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE.

NEGLI-

None of plaintiff'~ authorities on foreseeability,
proxin1ate cause, or negligence are of assistance in the
solution of the proble1n presented by this case. No witness anticipated that our operations would result in the
tremendous slide that occurred, nor did any witness testify fron1 facts that our operations did cause the slide.
The cause of the slide is unknown and unexplained.
It is a thing that has never occurred before or since in
this area, nor was there anything that warned or should
have warned anyone that such a cataclysm would occur.
The foreseeability rule applies to the things that
hmnan foresight can and should anticipate. Before we
can discuss particular injuries it must have been reasonably foreseeable that the cause of the injuries could be
anticipated. The rule is well stated in 38 Am. Jur., par.
61, page 712, as follows:
"In accordance with the general test of proximate cause above set forth, the law does not charge
a person with all the possible consequences of his
negligent act. He is not responsible for a consequence which is merely possible, according to occasional experience, but only for a consequence
which is probable, according to ordinary and usual
experience."
In the case at bar it was not even possible according
to occasional experience for anyone to forsee such a slide
because one had never occurred in any of defendant's
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gravel pits or anywhere else in this area, nor is there
any evidence that we could have anticipated any such
slide as a result of usual and ordinary experiences. Continuing the quotation, the author says:
"It has been said that the natural and probable consequences are those which hmnan foresight can anticipate because they happen so frequently that they may be expected to happen
again, and that the possible consequences are
those which happen so infrequently that they are
not expected to happen again. Negligence carries
with it liability for consequences which, in the
light of attendant circu1nstances, could reasonable
have been anticipated by a prudent man, but not
for casualties which, although possible, were
wholly improbable."
Also the same author, 38 Am. Jur., par.
has the following to say:

~-+,

pag-r

GG~,

"Generally speaking, no one is bound to guard
against or take 1neasures to avert that which, under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would not anticipate as likely to happen. Mischief which could by no reasonable possibility
have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would have anticipated, cannot be taken into
account as a basis upon :wh1ch to predicate a
wrong. Negligence Inust be determined upon the
facts as they appeared at the time, and not
h)· a judgment from actual consequences which
were not then to be apprehended by a prudent and
competent man. * * * If n1en were held answerable for everything they did which was dangerous
in fact, they would be held for all their acts from
which harm in fact ensued."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
The last sentence applies particularly 1n the case at
bar. It is true that the very nature of the operation itself
carried with it certain dangers. As Spence, a witness
for the plaintiff, said: Every gravel pit is inherently
dangerous, graYel sloughs off all the time, it never stops
sloughing, regardless of the height of the bank (R. 152).
But the danger is to the 1nen operating and blasting who
were right against the 1naterial being loosened. The
danger to be apprehended to them according to all the
witnesses was only from the sliding or sloughing of the
rocks, material and boulders in the imn1ediate operation.
The court in the trial of the case expressed this thought
in opposition to the plaintiff's continuous repetition,
when he said :
"The Court: Yes, it would be dangerous to
hirn in a shovel, or the man standing at the base,
but that isn't the issue here. These people aren't
charged with having endangered this man's life or
the man that put in the dynamite; they are charged
here with operating in such a manner that caused
this slide that caused this trouble * * * except insofar as it relates to the slide that happened that
covered the shovel, I don't see how it is rnaterial,
unless you can connect it up in that manner" (R.
181, 182).
Again the author at 38 Am. J'ur., par. 23, page 665,
has the following to say:
"Fundamentally, the duty of a person to use
care and his lia:bility for negligence depend upon
the tendency of his acts under the circumstances
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as thev are known or should be known to him.
The fo~dation of liability for negligence is knowledge-or what is deemed in law to be the same
thing : opportunity by the experience of reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge-of the peril
which subsequently results in injury."
Also,
"On the other hand, an injury is not actionable if it was not foreseen, or could not have been
foreseen or reasonably anticipated." 38 Am. Jur.,
par. 23, page 666.
This court is committed, of course, to the same universal doctrine as we have been discussing. In Bogden
v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 59 U. 505, 205 P. 571, thi s
court states at page 578 of the Pacific Reports, par. 7
and8,
1

"While the accident was an unfortunate one,
yet it was one which the defendant could not have
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held
liable for. In the conduct of modern 'business
enterprises, accidents will, and of necessity, must
happen. The law, however, does not impose liability unless the party charged with negligence
could by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have prevented the accident."
There is no evidence in this case that we knew or
reasonably could have known, because what happened
had never happened before, that our operations would
result in a slide of the entire mountain. Nor is there

an~·

evidence that our operation was the cause of the slide.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
\Ye took tlw gravel out with a

~hovel

and hy blasting-,

which wa:s eu:ston1ary. The only way that we could have
avoided the accident

wa~

not to use our property and not

to take out the gravel. Of course, plaintiff argues that
terracing the pit or taking the gravel off the top would
have avoided the accident, but we tried to terrace it without succe:s:s and there

wa~

no top from \vhich to take the

gravel, because the 1nountain was untouched when we
started the operation. The argun1ent is rnade that we
:'hould have foreseen that operating the way we did would
loosen up the entire mountain; the thing we could not
have anticipated; it has never happened before or since
in any of our operations or of any other operations in
this area. No plaintiff's argument narrows to this in
result: That "·e couldn't take out gravel from oltr land
and use our own knowledge and experience as to the
proper way to take out the gravel in the limited mnount
we needed. \Y e know of no rule of law that would in1pose
~uch

a restriction on us nor has the plaintiff cited any.

The plaintiff, himself, did not anticipate or foresee that
our operation would cause this tremendous 'slide. Any
danger that he did foresee was as open and obvious to
him a~ it was to us.
\\r e, therefore, respectfully sub1nit that the plaintiff

has

~hown

no action for neglig-ence

again~t

the defendant.
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POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECT TO
IT.

As we have shown, the evidence of the plaintiff hunself establishes that on Saturday, October 13, the day before the slide, at 3 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, the plaintiff personally came to our property seeking his shovel.
When New1nan called him and asked for the use of the
shovel he told the plain tiff he was going to use it at the
White Hill Sand & Gravel Cmnpany, and the plaintiff
consented. The plaintiff was familiar with the operation8
out there, but he made no effort to find out how the shovel
was to be used (R. 291, 300). His testimony is the only
testimony in the case "·ith reference to his conduct. He i~
a contractor with 35 years experience in roads and excavating. Newman wanted to use the shovel for three
days and he had already had it two weeks on October 13.
\Vhen plaintiff got to the gravel pit he couldn't find NewInan so "\Vhen I drove up I called to the operator, the
man on the shovel and told hin1 to get it out of the pit.
that the pit was dangerous and I didn't want the shovel
there." The operator was using the shovel at the time
plaintiff was out there. He had it between the ~lwd~
and the bank and he "·a~ within 20 feet of the hank. Plaintiff told the man to get the shovel out, and he made no
further effort to get it out except to drivP up to the petroleum plant to try to find Xewman or some of (; ibhons &
Reed'~ men. He thought that Perry (the operator) would
walk it out. hut lw didn't ~tn:· to see that he did. He knew
how to operatP the shovel. lmt he had hi~ g·ood elothe~ on
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car wa~ 1n danger and he didn ,t want to leave
hi~ car, and ~o he just went off and left the shovel in that
dangerous place and did nothing more about it (R. 302,
307).
and

hi~

The plaintiff testified that the place was absolutely
dangerous. He, nevertheless, didn't 1nove his own shovel,
which of course, he had a right to do. He knew how to
move it, but he had his good clothes on and he didn't want
to leave his car in danger. So frmn his testimony the
danger was Yery inuninent, so 1nuch so that he couldn't
take the tinw to nwve his shovel because to do so would
be to leave his car in danger. He then went and left his
shovel and did nothing further about it.
The slide did not occur until some 1-1 hours later.
The opera tor was using the shovel and, of course, the
plaintiff would know that he would continue to use it,
hut he voluntarily elected to leave it there for what he
:::a~-s were three reasons:
1.

The operator said that he would have to get

order3 from X ewman. Of course, that is not true because the plaintiff owned the shovel; he knew how to operate it and could have 1noved it himself. Also he immediately shows that that was not the reason because he
;-;ays he expected the 1nan to walk it out.
•)

He didn't 1nove it himself because he had on

his good clothes.
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3. He didn't move it hin1self because his car \Ya;:;
in danger. Obviously his car was in no more danger than
the shovel and yet he took no further action with reference to the shovel when there were 1-! hours during which
he could have done anything necessary to get the shovel
away. Obviously the plaintiff did not regard the conditions there as so dangerous as to require him to take the
shovel out. He, not we, assmned that the shovel would he
backed out. We had nothing whatever to do with where
the shovel was left; had no control over it, no connection with it. So the uncontradicted evidence shows that
the plaintiff with full knowledge of all the circmnstances
left his shovel and went his way. He either did not regard
the situation as dangerous to the shovel or else he voluntarily left it in a position of danger for his own convenience.
None of the defendant's officers or emplo~·ee~ shared
the plaintiff's apprehensions, so that he now finds himself in a position from which he is trying to extricate
hi1nself. That there can be no recovery by the plaintiff
under such circumstances is well established.
Referring again to 38 Am. Jur., par. 171, page 8-Hi,
we find the following, which is particularly applicable
in this case :
''Thus, a person upon the property of another, who deliberately chooses to expose himself
to danger of a patent character in the condition of
the premi~e~, which he could Pa~ilv avoid with the
exerci:-:P of care may not hold the iandowner liabl(•
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for any resulting injuries, whatever may be the
nature of his relationship to the landowner."
This is the doctrine of asstunption of risk. Also,
as to contributory negligence:
"X o rule of the comnwn law has been accepted
rnore readily or more widely than the general rule
that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
constitutes a defense for a defendant charged with
negligence." 38 Am. Jur., par. 174, page 848.

This court has long been cornn1itted to the doctrine
that a plaintiff \\·ho subjects himself or property to obYious risks to avoid inconvenience to himself cannot recover a:3 a matter of law.

Whalen v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 55 U. 445, 168 P.
99. In that case the court cited Shearman & Redfield On

..Yegligence with approval as follows:
"But the plaintiff will be chargeable with contributory negligence if he runs the risk of an obvious and serious danger merely to avoid inconvenience."
In the case of Bogden v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co.
59 U. 505, 205 P. 571 heretofore cited on another point,

this court said on the que'stion of contributory negligence
that the defendant did not even need to plead contributory negligence, and that without an affirmative plea
it could take advantage of the evidence produced by the
plaintiff:
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"That a defendant 1nay rely upon plaintiff's
evidence in that regard and may move for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict upon plaintiff's own
evidence showing contributory negligence, and
that he may request the court to charge upon
that question upon such evidence, is fully considered and determined in favor of the proposition by this court.", (citing cases).
In that case the defendant did not even plead contributory negligence and presented no issue with respect to
it.
In Kttchennwister c:3. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co ..
52 U. 116, 172 P. 725, at page 729 of the Pacific Reports,
this court distinguishes between assumption of ri'Sk and
contributory negligence, holding that the former implies
an intelligent choice, \\~hereas contributory negligence
does not necessaril~T require inteHigent choice on the
part of the plaintiff. Both assun1ption of risk and contributory negligence appear in the case at bar to preYent
the plaintiff from recovery.
The fact that the jur~· found no contributory negligence i~ not controlling. Not only do the Rules of CiYil
Procedure protect the defendant from unauthorized jury
verdicts hy permitting the court to giYe judgments notwithstanding the verdict, hut this court even prior to
the rules

"·a~

committed to that doctrine.

In the case of O'Brin1 z·s. Alston. Gl l'.
P. 791, the question

wa~

:~G~,

:21::

argued that the jury had fore-
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closed the

que~tion

of contributory negligence and

purged the plaintiff of the san1e. In that case as well
as in the case at bar the contributory negligence
appeared frmn the plaintiff's own evidence and this
court :'aid at page 793 of the Pacific Reports :

··It is contended in the case at bar, however,
that the jury passed upon this question, and have
purged the plain tiff and her son of negligence.
'Vhere, as here, plaintiff's own evidence discloses
that the acts and conduct of her son, for which
:-'he is responsible, were the proximate cause of
the injury and damage complained of, neither
court nor jury has a legal right to absolve her
fron1 the consequences of such conduct. To do
that would be to permit one to recover damages
which he himself has caused or could have prevented hy the exercise of ordinary care and a
compliance with the existing law. To permit a
recovery under such circumstances amounts to
the taking of property wrongfully from one
person and giving it to another. That, the law
doe·s not tolerate, and no court or jury can rise
above the law."
In the case at bar, the plaintiff could have walked
his own machine out of the pit had he so desired. He,
not the defendant, thought the shovel was in danger,
~'et

he did nothing about it. He left it. The shovel could

have been backed out, even though there was something
wrong \vith it that would not permit it to go forward
(R.

1:2~).
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In the case of Taylor vs. Bamberger Electric R. Co.,
62 e. 552, 220 P. 695, plaintiff chose to ride on the steps
of an open railroad car rather than at a safe place inside
because of sn10ke and heat in the interior of the car.
Several interesting questions were discussed by this
court that are present in the case at bar. There the
plaintiff's negligence appeared frmn his own testimony.
The court instructed the jury that the burden of proving
contributory negligence was upon the defendant. This
was error. In the case at bar the trial court did the same
thing (R. 428, 429), and it may well be that one of th-e
reasons for granting our motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was that the trial court realized
that it should not so have charged the jury because that
burden here was not ours. The evidence here is that of
the plaintiff, himself, and is without conflict. As a
n1atter of law, it bars the plaintiff frmn recovery. In
the Bamberger case, supra, the court said (p. 701 P.):
"The ordinary and natural meaning of the
language used h~· the court (that it was defendant's burden of proving contributory negligence)
to the minds of ordinary laymen would therefore
be to the effect that, the defendant having failed
to produce an~· affirmative evidence upon the
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, therefore that issue should be found in favor of plaintiff. I!! view of plaintiff's statements respecting
his acts and conduct, which, under the circumstances, were certainly inexcusable, the jury must
lwn' construed and applied the language of the
instruetion a~ we have indicated, or they could
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not haYe arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff
was not guilty of contributor·y negligence as that
tern1 was defined by the district court."
Under the circumstances it was held that this
in~truction \Yas erroneous. It was also held that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a rnatter of law; that the evidence was uncontradicted and
came frmn him, and, therefore, was not for the jury's
determination.
The Bamberger case has been cited in other jurisdictions and wa::; announced hy our court because of
similar holdings in other states. In the case of Denham
Theatre, Iuc., r:3. Beeler (19-tl, Colo.) 109 P. 2d G-±3, the
Supreme Court of Colorado cited the Bamberger case
and held that where the plaintiff's own evidence discloses his negligence there is no burden of proof resting
upon the defendant, and that to instruct the jury that
the defendant has the burden of proof under such eircrnnstances is error.
··\Vhere it may legitimately be inferred frmn
plaintiff's own evidence that she was contributorily negligent, there is no burden of proof
resting upon defendant." (p. 655 #4.)
The proximate cause of the plaintiff's InJury was
leaving the ~hoYel in a place of danger. \Ve did not
leave the shovel in a place of danger, we did not even
plaee it in a place of danger. Plaintiff left his shovel in
a place of danger according to his own evidence. Under
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such circmnstances his own conduct 1s the proximate
cause of his dmnage. In Olson vs. De1zrer & R. G. W. R.
Co., 98 U. 208, 98 P. 2d, 9-1-!, this court held that
although the defendant created the condition, it was the
plaintiff's own act in running into the defendant's train
which was the proxi1nate cause of the accident.
The plaintiff voluntarily left his shovel in a position
which he and he alone says was one of absolute danger.
It is not our duty to back his shovel out. That duty was
his if he felt it was in danger. Actually he could not
have believed it to be in danger or he wouldn't have left
it there. His excuse that he had on his good suit, etc.,
is the real reason and he cannot e'scape the consequences
of his own act Inerely because it was inconvenient for
hiin to act. The truth of the rna tter is that he didn't
think the shovel was in any particular danger and if
he didn't think so he can't charge us ·with any further
knowledge than he had. Plaintiff is in1paled upon either
or both horns of his dilennna, assmnption of risk or
contributory ngeligence.
POINT IV. A CONSIDERATION
POSITION AND BRIEF.

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

It will readily appear from an examination of the

record that the plaintiff has only partially and incompletely stated the undisputed facts as they appear from
the record. On pages 3 and G and 33 and :~-+ of his Brief,
plaintiff I i:-;t:~ 1:~ points which:
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1.

Do not establish any duty that we owe him,
Are not ac<>nrate,

3.

Do not exonerate plaintiff from his correspond-

ing duty eYen if there had been a duty owed hin1 by us.
He

::'tate~

in hi:3 first three propositions that the

graYel pit was operated with a Yertical bank extending
from GO to 100 feet in height resting on a wet clay base,
and that water ran down, through and along the clay
washing therefrom the fine n1aterial holding the coarse
graYel fonnation intact. Bearing in n1ind that we were
operating our own gravel pit on our own property, the
pl?.intiff has no right to c01nplain about the Inethod of
operation unless we owed hin1 a duty. However, nowhere does it appear that there was a vertical bank
60 to 100 feet in height. All the testimony is to the
effect that there

wa~

a solid slope and loose material

at least half way up the bank, the solid material had
never been touched and the loose material ·was that
which had

~loughed

off in the course of operations, so,

although only one witness,

~rr.

Hyde, ever stated that

the bank was 100 feet in height which obviously was
erroneous fr01n the testimony of all the other witnesses,
that would only establish that the 'so-called vertical bank
was 50 feet and that bank was never vertical, but always
~loped back. There is no evidence that there was a wet
(•lay hase. \Yater was found only intermittently, as also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
was the clay, nor did the water run down through the
gravel washing it out; the evidence is that the water
was never running and such water as there was was
intermittent.
We have already com1nented on the value of Dr.
Cook's evidence. He was the only one who purported
to give a theory of this tre1nendous slide, and on crossexamination he conceded that he didn't know what caused
it; that his theory was based upon facts given to him
which he conceded were not borne out by the evidence.
Point 4 by the plaintiff is that \Ye used dynamite.
There is nothing in the evidence that the defendant
violated any proper procedure in this respect.
In Point 5 plaintiff states that the operation was
not in compliance with the orders of the Industrial ComInission. This court will search the record in vain for
any such evidence. Not only are the so-called regulation:-;
of the Industrial C01nmission too vague and indefinite
to establish a duty, but .Mr. Spence the former ~al't·t~·
official of the state completely failed to point out an~·
violation of these vague regulations on our part.
Point 6 is c01npletely untrue that the pit wa:-; not
operated in the normal and usual manner. It is true
~I r. Hyde stated that he didn't operate the pit that
\\'a~,, but "·e are not bound to follow :Jl r. Hyde or his
views, and the very fact that ~~ r. Hyde himself left his
own machinen· and equipment where it wa:-; damaged
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hy the cataclysm that occurred is conclusive proof that
.Jlr. Hyde did not expect that our operations were
dangerous to hiln. On the other hand, our foreuran and
both ~Ir. Reed and ~Jr. Gibbons testified that their
operations \Yere in accordance with established practice,
and that we were using the shovel for the very purpose
for which it had been invented.
Point 7 states that we had owned and operated
other gravel pits and are farniliar with other and nor1nal
procedures. That is true, and it is like·wise true that
this pit was operated in a norn1almanner.
There is no point to either nurnber 8 and 9 since
there is no evidence whatever that any other of our
operators or engineers would have worked the pit in
any different way than it was worked. In fact, the
contrary appears, because both :Mr. Gibbons and :Mr.
Reed are experienced operators and engineers and the
pit was operated as it was with their full knowledge
and approval.
The plaintiff stated in point 10 that we \Yere warned
by ~Ir. Hyde that the operation was dangerous. \V e
have already shown that all :Mr. Hyde was afraid of
was for the safety of the men actually working in the
blasting and in the removal of the material. He never
warned us that there was any possible danger of the
:-:lide that actually occurred, nor did anyone el'se, nor is
there a word of evidence that any such slide has ever
occurred before in this area.
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There is no point to nmnber 11 because it was conceded that there was a danger to the rnen working from
the sloughing off of n1aterial frmn the face of the cliff.
That is not the kind of danger that plaintiff is complaining of in this case.
On point 12, there is not a word of evidence that
rnen frorn a commercial operation refused to blast at
this pit. The most that can be gained from that evidence
is that two rnen came out and left; that they were hardrock rniners and didn't care to work in gravel, presumably because they knew nothing about blasting in
gravel.
On point 13 there is not one witness who testified
that this slide reasonably could be anticipated. Nothing
of the kind was foreseen by anyone or could be forseen
by anyone because such a thing has never before occurred
in this area.
N" ot one of the 13 points shows an:, duty that we

owed the plaintiff. There is nothing in this case that
required us to operate our pit to suit either l\lr. lly(h··~
ideas or the plaintiff's. On the other hand, it

appt>nr~

from both the testirnony of Mr. Hyde and from thP
plaintiff himself that if there was any danger both of
thenr knew of it and were far rnore apprehensive than
\\'Hl-l the defendant, yet their apprehensions did not
lead them to protect their property eitltPr because they
thought their property \\·a~ in no dang-er and if they
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thought that to be the fact we cannot be charged with
anticipating· ~omething neither of then1 anticipated, or
in spite of the danger which was nwre apparent to thern
than to us they deliberately and of their own accord
left their property where it could be injured. In either
event there can be no recovery either by .Mr. Hyde or
the plaintiff since we owed no duty to them and if we
did, they had knowledge equal or superior to ours and
did not act to protect th,~Inselve~, or else they felt that
our operations were not dangerous to their property.
rnder any one of the propositions there can be no
recovery by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has cited many cases with which we have
no quarrel. Actually they have no application, although
several of the1n do announce well-established principals
of law which absolutely bar the plaintiff from recovery
in thi's case.
The cases and the texts discuss proxim,ate cause,
foreseeability, negligence ttnd other well-established
principle~.

There is not one case cited, and we have

found none, where the event that caused the injury was
of the kind with which we are concerned here. It is
true that the rule is quite uniform that the foreseeability rule in determining proximate cause does not
require the negligent person to forsee the injury in the
precise fonn in which it occurred or to anticipate the
particular consequences actually caused from his act or
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ommission. However, it is likewise true that in all
jurisdictions in detennining proximate cause the law
does not charge a person with all possible consequences
of his negligent act.
"He is not responsible for a consequence
which is 1nerely possible, according to occassional
experience, but only for a consequence which is
probable, accordin~ to ordinary and usual experience. It has been said that the natural and
probable consequences are those which human
foresight can anticipate because they happen so
frequently that they may be expected to happen
again, and that the possible consequences are
those which happen so infrequently that they
are not expected to happen again. Negligence
carries with it liability for consequences which,
in the light of attendant circu~nstances, could
reasonably have been anticipated by a prudent
nmn, but not for casualties which, although possible, were wholly improbable." 38 Am J11r, par Gl,
page 712, (supra).
Of course, all the authorities eited assume that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. In Co1·e rs.
Tho m psou_. 25-t P. 2d 10-l-7, cited hy plain tiff at pagt> :r).
this court affirmed a directed verdiet lwc-a u~<' of the
decea~ed~~ contributor~· negligence. The ('ourt al~o di~
cussed the last clear chance rule, \Yith which we ar<' not
eoncerned in this case.
Stonp rs. Railroad, 32 Utah 20;), S9 J>. 7:2:.!, <'Olllmences at page 715 of the Pacific Report~. and the
llUotation given hy the plaintiff i~ completed h~· the following ,,·hich when applied to plaintiff har~ hi~ rP<·on•ry:
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··If the act is one \Vhich the party, in the
exerei::'e of ordinary care, could have anticipated
as likely to result in injury, then he is liable for
any injury actually resulting fr01n it, although he
could not haYe anticipated the particular injury
which did occur."
The eYidence in the case at bar is all to the effect that
no reasonable person could have anticipated the slide
that injured the plaintiff's shovel. The plaintiff howPYer, clain1s that he was apprehensive for his shovel
working in clo::'e proximity to the bank He was not so
apprehensive that he took any ~teps to rernove it from
the pit, clearly indicating either that he didn't care or
that he didn't think it was in any particular danger.
The next case cited by the plaintiff is Mountain
States Tel & Tel. Co., vs. Consolidated Freightways, 242
P. ~d 563 (cited in plaintiff's index as 232 P. 2d). That
('a~e merely applies the test of foreseeability, which as
\H' have already pointed out has no application here
:-:ince no one could forsee or did forsee that the entire
mountain would slip away or that there was any danger
to anyone except as might be caused by sloughing
material and rocks.
The texts cited by plaintiff are merely repetitious
of the principles announced in the cases. This is particularly true of the annotation 155 A. L. R. 157.
In the C'ase of Coray vs. Southern Pacific, 112 lTtah

1G6, lS;) P. :2d 963, this court made several interesting
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observations particularly applicable ~1ere and which in
our judgment point up both the lack of a cau~e of action
and also the plaintiff's equal responsibility if there wa~
any responsibility. At page 968 of the Pacific Report:'.
this court stated in par. 12:
··Jurors sitting as triers of the fact are not
empowered to decide legal questions, nor draw
an)~ conclusions of law therefron1 except a~ guided
bv the instructions of the court. If there i~ no
dispute as to the facts, there is no occasion to
instruct the jury, for the jurors have no conflict
in evidence to detern1ine, and no ultimate fact:'
to find."
In our case as we have already pointed out the
plaintiff hi1nself brought out all the facts with reference
to his knowledge, his fears, his apprehensions and what
he did. rrhere \YHS no burden upon US to prove this and
it was undisputed. There was nothing for the jury to
decide. Nor i::-~ it disputed that we owned the land and
that the plaintiff's shovel was present on ~aid land at
the plaintiff's own ri~l~. This court abo ~aid (par. 1-l-)
in that case:
"The 'cause' must, of course, he the legal
cause, in order to be the basis of recovery. To
show merely that the injury would not Ita,.,.
occurred had there been no violation of the ad,
i~ not the equivalent of showing that the ,·iol<~
tion was the eause thereof. 'In order to lw t]w
legal eause of another's harm, it is not PllOil.!..di
that the harm would not han• occurn·d had thP
actor not heen negligent • • •. The tH'.!..dig·pJH·p
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must also be a substantial factor as \veil as an
actual factor in bringing about the pl'aintiff's
harnr. The word 'substantial' is used to denote
the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an
effeet in producing the harnr as to lead reasonable
men to regard it as a cause, using that word in
the popular sense in which there always lurks
the idea of responsibility, rather than in the socalled 'philosophic sense,' which includes every
one of the great nurnber of eYents without which
any happening would not have occurred. Each
of these events is a cause in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' yet the effect of many of them is
so insignificant that no ordinary mind would
think of them as causes.'"
On page 969 this court said :
·'So in the instant case the question of lrability may be considered as a question of whether
there was any breach of duty on the part of the
railroad to plaintiff's intestate, rather than a
question of proximate cause."
That is exactly the question here. There \vas no
breach of duty in the case at bar owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff and the court so found as did this court
in the Coray case.

On the question of plaintiff's contributory negligenee plaintiff, of course, is understandably vague. He
~tate~

at page 38 of his brief:
"Under the tension and strain of cross exru:nination as to why he did not personally rernove the
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shovel instead of attempting to locate Newman,
he testified that he had his good clothes on and
didn't want to leave his car in danger."
This is not the entire extent of the plaintiff's conduct as we have already pointed out and to which we
shall n1ake no further reference.
The case of Clay v. Dunford, 239 P. 2d 1075, cited
by plaintiff at page 39, discusses assumption of risk a~
compared to contributory negligence and states that
(p. 1076);
"The essential elements of assu1ned risk are
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of

a SJJecific defect or dangerous condition caused
by the negligence of the defendant in the violation of some duty owing to the plaintiff, * * *
together with the plaintiff''s appreciation of the
danger to be encountered and his voluntary
exposure of himself to it."
Page 1077 of the Pacific Reporter also states:
"It has been said that 'knowledge of the ri~k
is the watchword of * * * a8~umption of risk'."
In our case there is lacking also the Yiolation of a
duty owed plaintiff h)· us.
The case of Gibbs vs. Bl11e Cab, ~-t-9 P. :2d 21:~, cited
by plaintiff at page 40, statE's as is the general rule that
each case dPpPnrl~ on its own faeb, with which we agrPP.
There is no case cited hy plaintiff, nor have wt>
found one a~:-:erting- that a propert~· owner u~mg hi:Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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own property for the very purposes for which it is
valuable is bound to protect a person on said property
for his own benefit, \Yith full knowledge of everything
being done and of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the activity, frmn the results of an event that
was not and could not be foreseen by anyone present at
the operation.
The case of Stickle vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co.,
:251 P. ~()/, cited at page 41 of plaintiff's hrief does not
add anything to the discussion. This court said at page
~10 of the Pacific Reporte1·, par. 7 and 8:
.. It should be kept in n1ind that so far as the
quanttun of proof necessary to take the question
of contributory negligence frorn the jury is concerned, the tests are the sarne as with respect to
primary negligence."
Ln the case at bar there is no conflict in the evidence
regarding plaintiff's conduct. It cmne from the plaintiff'~

own lips. He, of all those present, was the only one

who clairned that there was any danger to his shovel.
He did nothing about it. He could have done something
about it. He voluntarily elected to do nothing, either
because he didn't think there was any pressing danger
to the shovel or else because he \Yas heedless of its
safety. There \vas nothing to he decided by the jury with
reference to plaintiff's conduct, nor was there anything
to be decided by the jury with reference to our duty so
far a~ thc> plaintiff was concerned.
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The very reason that our rules have been drafted
as they are to per1nit courts to give judg1nent notwithstanding jury verdicts is a long recognized necessity of
protecting litigants from unwarranted, unauthorized and
illegal jury verdicts.
CONCLUSION
The District Court was right in giving judgment to
the defendant. In the use and operation of its property
it owed no duty to the plaintiff; it was guilty of no acts
or omissions for which it could be held liable for negligence. It was also wrong to submit the case to the
jury because the plaintiff's own testimony establishes
that he both assumed the risk and that his own conduct
wm; the proxinmte cause of his dmnage. If there

wa:-~

negligence in this case it was the negligence of the
plaintiff ·which bars his recovery.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES,
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.
Attorneys for Defendnat

411 Utah Oil Building
~alt Lake City 1, Utah
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